Bit-decomposition, which is proposed by Damgård et al., is a powerful tool for multi-party computation (MPC). Given a sharing of secret x, it allows the parties to compute the sharings of the bits of x in constant rounds. With the help of bit-decomposition, constant-rounds protocols for various MPC problems can be constructed. However, bit-decomposition is relatively expensive, so constructing protocols for MPC problems without relying on bit-decomposition is a meaningful work. In multi-party computation, it remains an open problem whether the modulo reduction problem can be solved in constant rounds without bit-decomposition.
Introduction
Secure multi-party computation (MPC) allows the computation of a function f when the inputs to f are secret values held by distinct parties. After running the MPC protocol, the parties obtains only the predefined outputs but nothing else, and the privacy of their inputs are guaranteed. Although generic solutions for MPC already exist [BGW88, GMW87] , the efficiency of these generic protocols tends to be low. So we focus on constructing efficient protocols for specific functions. More exactly, we are interested in integer arithmetic in the information theory setting [NO07] .
A proper choice of representation of the inputs can have great influence on the efficiency of the computation [DFK + 06, Tof09]. For example, when we want to compute the sum or the product of some private integer values, we'd better represent these integers as elements of a prime field Z p and perform the computations using an arithmetic circuit as additions and multiplications are trivial operations in the field. If we use the binary representation of the integers and a Boolean circuit to compute the expected result, then we will get a highly inefficient protocol as the bitwise addition and multiplication are very expensive [CFL83a, CFL83b] . On the other hand, if we want to compare some (private) integer values, the binary representation will be of great advantage as comparison is a bit-oriented operation. In this case, the arithmetic circuit over Z p will be a bad choice.
To bridge the gap between the arithmetic circuits and the Boolean circuits, Damgård et al. [DFK + 06] proposed a novel technique, called bit-decomposition, to convert a sharing of secret x into the sharings of the bits of x. This is a very useful tool in MPC because it gives us the best of the two worlds. For example, for a protocol built in the prime field Z p , if a series of bit-oriented operations (such as comparisons, computations of Hamming weight) are needed in the future procedure, we can, using bit-decomposition, transform the sharings of the integers into the sharings of the bits of the integers. Then, the future procedure can be handled easily. On the other hand, in a Boolean circuit, if we need a series of additions and multiplications of the integers (which are represented as bits), then we can (freely) transform the binary representation of these integers into elements of a prime field (e.g. Z p ) and perform all the additions and multiplications in this field. When the expected results are obtained (in the field), bit-decomposition can be involved and the (aimed) binary representation of the results can be finally obtained.
Thus, bit-decomposition is useful both in theory and application. However, the bit-decomposition protocol is relatively expensive in terms of round and communication complexities. So the work on constructing (constant-rounds) protocols for MPC problems without relying on bit-decomposition is not only interesting but also meaningful. Recently, in [NO07] , Nishide et al. constructed more efficient protocols for comparison, interval test and equality test of shared secrets without relying on the bitdecomposition protocol. However, in MPC, it remains an open problem whether the modulo reduction problem can be solved in constant rounds without bit-decomposition [Tof07] . In this paper, we show a linear protocol for the (public) modulo reduction problem without relying on bit-decomposition. What's more, the bit-decomposition protocol of [DFK + 06] can only de-composite the sharing of secret x into the sharings of the bits of x. However, especially in practice, we may often need the sharings of the digits of x. Here the digits can be base-m for any m ≥ 2. For example, in real life, integers are (almost always) represented as base-10 digits. Then, MPC protocols for practical use may often require the base-10 digits of the secret shared integers. Another example is as follows. If the integers are about time and date, then base-24, base-30, base-60, or base-365 digits may be required. So, to meet these requirements, we propose a generalization to bit-decomposition in this paper.
Our Contributions
First we introduce some necessary notations. We focus mainly on the multi-party computation based on linear secret sharing schemes. Assume that the underlying secret sharing scheme is built on field Z p where p is a prime with bit-length l (i.e. l = log p ). For secret x ∈ Z p , we use [x] p to denote the secret sharing of x, and [x] B to denote the sharings of the bits of
The public modulo reduction problem can be formalized as follows:
where x ∈ Z p and m ∈ {2, 3, ..., p − 1}.
In existing public modulo reduction protocols [DFK + 06, Tof07], the bit-decomposition protocol is involved, incurring O(l log l) communication complexity. What's more, in the worst case, the communication complexity of this protocol may go up to Θ(l 2 ). Specifically, the existing modulo reduction protocol uses the bit-decomposition protocol to reduce the "size" of the problem, and then uses up to l comparisons, which is non-trivial, to determine the final result. This is essentially an "exhaustive search". If the bit-length of the inputs to the comparison protocol is relatively long, e.g. Θ(l), the overall complexity will go up to Θ(l 2 ). So, the efficiency of the protocol may be very poor. To solve this problem, we propose a protocol, which achieves constant round complexity and linear communication complexity, for public modulo reduction without relying on bit-decomposition. Besides this, we also propose an enhanced protocol that can output the sharings of the bits of (x mod m), i.e. [x mod m] B .
Some primitives involved in bit-decomposition are generalized to meet the requirements of our modulo reduction protocol. Using these generalized primitives and some other techniques, we also construct a generalized bit-decomposition protocol which can, in constant rounds, convert the sharing of secret x into the sharings of the digits of x, along with the sharings of the bits of every digit. The digits can be base-m for any m ≥ 2. We name this protocol the Base-m Digit-Bit-Decomposition Protocol. The asymptotic communication complexity of this protocol is O(l log l). Obviously, when m is a power of 2, this protocol degenerates to the bit-decomposition protocol.
For illustration, we will show an example here. Pick a binary number
If [x] p is given to the bit-decomposition protocol as input, it outputs
if [x] p and m = 2 (or m = 4, 8, 16, 32, ...) are given to our Base-m Digit-Bit-Decomposition protocol as inputs, it will output the same result with the bit-decomposition protocol above; however, when [x] p and m = 10 are given to our Base-m Digit-Bit-Decomposition protocol, it will output
which is significantly different from the output of bit-decomposition. We also propose a simplified version of the protocol, called Finally, we'd like to stress that all the protocols proposed in our paper are constant-rounds and unconditionally secure, and our techniques can also be used to construct non-constant-rounds variations which may be preferable in practice.
Related Work
The problem of bit-decomposition is a basic problem in MPC and was partially solved by Algesheimer et al. in [ACS02] . However, their solution is not constant-rounds and can only handle values that are noticeably smaller than p. Damgård et al. proposed the first constant-rounds (full) solution to the problem of bit-decomposition in [DFK + 06]. This ice-break work is based on linear secret sharing schemes [BGW88, GRR98] . Independently, Shoenmakers and Tuyls [ST06] solved the problem of bitdecomposition for multiparty computation based on (Paillier) threshold homomorphic cryptosystems [CDN01, DN03] . In order to improve efficiency, Nishide and Ohta [NO07] proposed a simplification to the bit-decomposition protocol of [DFK + 06] by throwing off one unnecessary invocation of bitwise addition, which is the most expensive primitive in bit-decomposition. Moreover, they proposed solutions for comparison, interval test and equality test of shared secrets without relying on the expensive bit-decomposition protocol. Their techniques are novel, and have enlightened us a lot. Recently, Toft showed a novel technique that can reduce the communication complexity of bit-decomposition to almost linear [Tof09]. Although we do not focus on the almost linear property of protocols, some techniques used in their paper are so inspiring and enlightening to us. In a followup work, Reistad and Toft proposed a linear bit-decomposition protocol [RT09] . However, the security of their protocol is non-perfect.
As for the problem of modulo reduction (without bit-decomposition), Guajardo et al. proposed a partial solution to this problem in the threshold homomorphic setting [GMS10] . In [CS10] , Catrina et al. dealt with the non-constant-rounds private modulo reduction protocol with the incomplete accuracy and statistical privacy in the setting where shared secrets are represented as fixed-point numbers.
Preliminaries
In this section we introduce some important notations and some known primitives which will be frequently mentioned in the rest of the paper.
Notations and Conventions
The multiparty computation considered in this paper is based on linear secret sharing schemes, such as Shamir's [Sha79] . As mentioned above, we denote the underlying field as Z p where p is a prime with binary length l.
As Obviously, for multiparty protocols, this multiplication protocol is a dominant factor of complexity as it involves communication. So, as in previous works, the round complexity of the protocols is measured by the number of rounds of parallel invocations of the multiplication protocol, and the communication complexity is measured by the number of invocations of the multiplication protocol. For example, if a protocol involves a multiplications in parallel and then another b multiplications in parallel, then we can say that the round complexity is 2 and the communication complexity is a + b multiplications. We have to say that the complexity analysis made in this paper is somewhat rough for we focus mainly on the ideas of the solution, but not on the details of the implementation. We
p denotes the sharing of the i th base-m digit of x with 0 ≤ x i ≤ (m − 1). The digit-bit-wise sharing of x, which is denoted by [x] m D,B , is defined as below: 
where A, B, C ∈ Z p and b ∈ {0, 1}, it means the following: if b = 1, then C is set to A; otherwise, C is set to B.
We call this command the conditional selection command [Tof07] . When all the variables in this command are public, this "selection" can of course be done. When the variables are shared or even bitwise shared, this can also be done. Specifically, the command
can be realized by setting
which costs 1 round and 1 multiplication; the command
can be realized by the following procedure:
Note that the above procedure costs 1 round, l invocations of multiplication.
Other cases, such as
can be realized similarly. We will frequently use this conditional selection command in our protocols.
Known Primitives
We will now simply introduce some existing primitives which are important building blocks of this paper. All these primitives are proposed in [DFK + 06].
• Random-Bit The Random-Bit protocol is the most basic primitive which can generate a shared uniformly random bit unknown to all parties. In the linear secret sharing setting, which is the case in this paper, it takes only 2 rounds and 2 multiplications.
• Bitwise-LessThan Given two bitwise shared inputs, < y] p . We note that using the method of [Tof09], this protocol can be realized in 6 rounds and 13l + 6 √ l multiplications. Notice that 13l + 6 √ l ≤ 14l holds for l ≥ 36 which is often the case in practice. So, for simplicity, we refer to the complexity of this protocol as 6 rounds and 14l multiplications.
• Bitwise-Addition Given two bitwise shared inputs, [x] B and [y] B , the Bitwise-Addition protocol outputs [x + y] B . An important point of this protocol is that d = x + y holds over the integers, not (only) mod p. This protocol, which costs 15 rounds and 47l log l multiplications, is the most expensive primitive of the bit-decomposition protocol of [DFK + 06]. We will not use this primitive in this paper, but use Bitwise-Subtraction instead. However, the asymptotic complexity of our Bitwise-Subtraction protocol is the same with that of the Bitwise-Addition since they both involve a generic prefix protocol which costs O(l log l) multiplications. We will introduce our Bitwise-Subtraction protocol later.
A Simple Introduction to Our New Primitives
In this section, we will simply introduce the new primitives proposed in this paper. We will only describe the inputs and the outputs of the protocols, along with some simple comments. All these new primitives will be described in detail in Section 6.
• Bitwise-Subtraction The Bitwise-Subtraction protocol accepts two bitwise shared values [x] B and [y] B and outputs [x − y] B . This protocol is in fact first proposed in [Tof09] and is re-described (in a widely different form) in this paper. In our protocols, we only need a restricted version (of Bitwise-Subtraction) which requires x ≥ y. A run of this restricted protocol is denoted by
It costs 15 rounds and 47l log l multiplications.
• BORROWS This protocol is used as a sub-protocol in the Bitwise-Subtraction protocol above to compute the borrow bits (as well as in the Bitwise-Subtraction * protocol). Given two bitwise sharings [x] B and [y] B , this protocol outputs
where [b i ] p is the sharing of the borrow bit at bit-position i ∈ {0, 1, ..., l − 1}. The complexity of this protocol is 15 rounds and 47l log l multiplications.
• Random-Digit-Bit Given m ∈ {2, 3, ..., p−1} as input, the Random-Digit-Bit protocol outputs
where 
The complexity of this protocol is 6 rounds and 14l multiplications.
• Random-Solved-Digits-Bits Using the above two primitives as subprotocols, we can construct the Random-Solved-Digits-Bits protocol which, when given m ∈ {2, 3, ..., p − 1} as input, outputs a digit-bit-wise shared random value [r] m D,B satisfying r < p. We denote a run of this protocol by This protocol takes 14 rounds and 312l multiplications.
• Digit-Bit-wise-Subtraction This protocol is a novel generalization to the bitwise subtraction protocol and is very important to this paper. The complexity of this protocol goes down to 21 rounds and 16l+47l (m) log l (m) multiplications.
With the above primitives, we can construct our Modulo-Reduction protocol and Base-m DigitBit-Decomposition protocol, which will be described in detail separately in Section 4 and Section 5.
Multiparty Computation for Modulo Reduction without Bit-Decomposition
In this section, we give out our (public) Modulo-Reduction protocol which is realized without relying on bit-decomposition. This protocol is constant-rounds and involves only O(l) multiplications. Informally speaking, our Modulo-Reduction protocol is essentially the Least Significant Digit Protocol and is a natural generalization to the Least Significant Bit Protocol (i.e. the LSB protocol) in [NO07] . Recall that for any integer x, the sharing of the least significant base-m digit of x is denoted by [x 0 ] m p , and the bitwise sharing of the least significant base-m digit of x is denoted by [x 0 ] m B . The protocol is described in detail in Figure 1 .
The modulo reduction protocol, Modulo-Reduction(·), for computing the residue of a shared integer modulo a public integer. and (1.c), we can decide whether a carry is set at the least significant digit-position when performing the base-m addition. What's more, we use the Digit-Bit-wise-LessThan protocol in line (1.d) to decide whether a wrap-around modulo p occurs when performing the (whole) addition. Using these "knowledge", we can "select" the correct value for [x 0 ] m p . Privacy: The only possible information leakage takes place in line (1.a), where a reveal command is involved. However, the revealed value, i.e. c, is uniformly random, so it leaks no information about the secret x. So the privacy is guaranteed.
Complexity: Complexity comes mainly from the invocations of sub-protocols. Note that the two invocations of Bitwise-LessThan and the invocation of Digit-Bit-wise-LessThan can be scheduled in parallel. In all it will cost 22 rounds and The enhanced Modulo-Reduction protocol, Modulo-Reduction + (·), for computing the bitwise shared residue of a shared integer modulo a public integer.
Addition over the integers.
S is the subtrahend. The correctness and privacy of this protocol can be proved similarly to the Modulo-Reduction protocol above. By carefully selecting the Minuend and the Subtrahend, we can get the expected result by using only one invocation of the Bitwise-Subtraction * protocol. As for the complexity, note that every conditional selection command in this protocol involves L(m) multiplications, whereas in the Modulo-Reduction protocol it involves only 1 multiplication. The overall complexity of this protocol is 37 rounds and
multiplications. Obviously, when L(m) is large enough (e.g. L(m) = l), the asymptotic (communication) complexity of this protocol goes up to O(l log l), which is the asymptotic complexity of the bit-decomposition protocol. We argue that this is inevitable because when m is large enough, this protocol becomes an enhanced bit-decomposition protocol. We will describe this in detail in Section 7.
A Generalization to Bit-Decomposition
In this section, we will propose our generalization to bit-decomposition, i.e. the Base-m Digit-BitDecomposition protocol. The details of this protocol are presented in Figure 3 . The main framework of this protocol is similar to the bit-decomposition protocol of [Tof09].
The Base-m Digit-Bit-Decomposition protocol, Digit-Bit-Decomposition(·, m), for converting the sharing of secret x into the digit-bit-wise sharing of x.
Input: [x]
p with x ∈ Z p and the base m ∈ {2, 3, ..., p − 1}. As for the correctness, using the Digit-Bit-wise-LessThan protocol in line (3.b), we can decide whether a wrap-around modulo p occurs when performing the addition in line (3.a). Based on this "knowledge" we can "select" the correct value forc = x + r. Then, using the Digit-Bit-wiseSubtraction * protocol in line (3.c), with the digit-bit-wise sharing ofc = x + r and r as inputs, we can get the expected result, i.e. [x] m D,B . In fact, the major obstacle in constructing this protocol is how to realize the Digit-Bit-wise-Subtraction * protocol, which is described in detail in Section 6.6.
Privacy is straightforward. As for the complexity, it is easy to see that there are only three sub-protocols that count for complexity, i.e. the Random-Solved-Digits-Bits protocol, the Digit-Bit-wise-LessThan protocol, and the Digit-Bit-wise-Subtraction * protocol. So, the overall complexity of this protocol is 14 + 6 + 30 = 50 rounds and 312l + 14l + (47l log l + 47l log (L(m))) = 326l + 47l log l + 47l log (L(m)) multiplications. The communication complexity is upper bounded by 326l + 94l log l multiplications as L(m) ≤ l.
If we do not need [x] m D,B but (only) need [x]
m D instead, then the above protocol can be simplified. The method is to replace the Digit-Bit-wise-Subtraction * protocol with the Digit-Bit-wiseSubtraction * − protocol. We call this simplified protocol the Base-m Digit-Decomposition Protocol, a run of which is denoted by Digit-Decomposition(·, m). The correctness and privacy of this protocol can be similarly proved. The complexity goes down to 14 + 6 + 21 = 41 rounds and
multiplications. Recall that l (m) = log m p ≤ l, so the communication complexity is upper bounded by 342l + 47l log l multiplications.
Realizing the Primitives
In this section, we will describe in detail the (new) primitives which are essential for the protocols of our paper. Informally, most of the protocols in this section are generalized version of the protocols of [DFK + 06] from base-2 to base-m for any m ≥ 2. It will be seen that, when m is a power of 2, some of our primitives degenerate to the existing primitives in [DFK + 06]. So, in the complexity analysis, we focus on the case where m is not a power of 2, i.e. m < 2 L(m) .
Bitwise-Subtraction
We describe the Bitwise-Subtraction protocol here. In fact, this protocol is already proposed in [Tof09]. They reduced the problem of bitwise-subtraction to the Post-fix Comparison problem. Here, we re-consider the problem of bitwise-subtraction and solve it in a (highly) similar manner to the Bitwise-Addition protocol of [DFK + 06].
As is mentioned in Section 3, we will first propose a restricted (bitwise-subtraction) protocol, Bitwise-Subtraction * , which requires that the minuend is not less than the subtrahend. We will only use this restricted version in this paper. The general version without the above restriction can be realized with the help of the Bitwise-LessThan protocol. We will describe this in detail later. Given a BORROWS protocol that can compute the sharings of the borrow bits, the Bitwise-Subtraction * protocol can be realized as in Figure 4 .
The restricted Bitwise-Subtraction protocol, Bitwise-Subtraction * (·), for computing the bitwise sharing of the difference between two bitwise shared values. This protocol requires that the minuend is not less than the subtrahend. Note that the output of this protocol, i.e. [x − y] B , is of bit length l, not l + 1. This is because x ≥ y holds and thus we do not need a sign bit. Correctness is straightforward. Privacy follows readily from the fact that we only call private sub-protocols. The complexity of this protocol is the same with that of the Bitwise-Addition protocol in [DFK + 06], i.e. 15 rounds and 47l log l multiplications [NO07] .
Although in all the protocols proposed in this paper we will only use the Bitwise − Subtraction * protocol above, we also give out the general version, i.e. the Bitwise-Subtraction protocol. With (arbitrary) inputs
the Bitwise-Subtraction protocol outputs 
It can be verified that X ≥ Y always holds. Finally set
is obtained. Correctness and privacy can be easily verified. Comparing with the Bitwise-Subtraction * protocol, this protocol costs 7 additional rounds and 16l additional multiplications. So the overall complexity of this protocol is 22 rounds and 47l log l + 16l multiplications.
Computing the Borrow Bits
We now describe the BORROWS protocol which can compute the sharings of the borrow bits. In fact our BORROWS protocol is highly similar to the CARRIES protocol in [DFK + 06]. So only the difference is sketched here. As in [DFK + 06], we use an operator • : × → , where = {S, P, K}, which is defined by S • x = S for all x ∈ , K • x = K for all x ∈ , P • x = x for all x ∈ . Here, • represents the borrow-propagation operator, whereas in [DFK + 06] it represents the carry-propagation operator. When computing [x − y] B (where x ≥ y holds) with two bitwise shared inputs
for bit-position i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , l − 1}, let e i = S iff a borrow is set at position i (i.e. x i < y i ); e i = P iff a borrow would be propagated at position i (i.e. x i = y i ); e i = K iff a borrow would be killed at position i (i.e. x i > y i ). It can be easily verified that b i = 1 (i.e. the i th borrow bit is set, which means the i th bit needs to borrow a "1" from the (i + 1) th bit) iff e i • e i−1 • · · · • e 0 = S. It can be seen that in the case where • represents the borrow-propagation operator and in the case where • represents the carry-propagation operator, the rules for • (i.e. S • x = S, K • x = K and P • x = x for all x ∈ ) are completely the same. This means that when computing the borrow bits, once all the e i s are obtained, the residue procedure of our BORROWS protocol will be (completely) the same with that of the CARRIES protocol (in [DFK + 06]). So, the only difference lies in the procedure of computing the e i s, which will be sketched below. As in [DFK + 06], we represent S, P and K with bit vectors
(1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0), (0, 0, 1) ∈ {0, 1} 3 .
Then, for every bit-position i ∈ {0, 1, ..
can be obtained as follows: 
Random-Digit-Bit
We will now introduce the Random-Digit-Bit protocol for generating a random bitwise shared base-m digit, which is denoted by d here. In fact, d is a random integer satisfying 0 ≤ d ≤ m − 1. We would like to stress that the output of this protocol is not (only) the sharing of d, but the sharings of the bits of d. The knowledge of (the sharings of) the bits of d helps us a lot in constructing other primitives. The details are presented in Figure 5 .
The Random-Digit-Bit protocol, Random-Digit-Bit(·), for generating the bitwise sharing of a random digit. The digit is base-m for any m ≥ 2.
Input: The base m satisfying 2 ≤ m ≤ p − 1.
Figure 5: The Random-Digit-Bit Protocol
As for the correctness, to generate a base-m digit, the protocol generates L(m) random shared bits first. Then using Bitwise-LessThan, the protocol checks whether the generated random integer is less than m, which is a basic requirement for a base-m digit. Note that when m is a power of 2 (i.e. m = 2 L(m) ), this check is unnecessary because an L(m)-bit binary number is at most 2 L(m) − 1 and thus is always less than m.
As for the privacy, when this protocol does not abort, the only information leaked is that d < m, which is an a priori fact.
As for the complexity, note that the protocol contains L(m) invocations of Random-Bit (in parallel) and one invocation of Bitwise-LessThan. So, when m is not a power of 2, the total complexity of one run of this protocol is 8 rounds and 16L(m) multiplications. As in [DFK + 06], using a Chernoff bound, it can be seen that if this protocol has to be repeated in parallel to get a lower abort probability, then the round complexity is still 8, and the amortized communication complexity goes up to 4 × 16L(m) = 64L(m) multiplications.
Digit-Bit-wise-LessThan
The Digit-Bit-wise-LessThan protocol proposed here is a natural generalization to the Bitwise-LessThan protocol. Recall that when we write [C] p , where C is a Boolean test, it means that C ∈ {0, 1} and C = 1 iff C is true. The details of the protocol are presented in Figure 6 .
The Digit-Bit-wise-LessThan protocol, Digit-Bit-wise-LessThan(·), for comparing two digit-bit-wise shared values.
Figure 6: The Digit-Bit-wise-LessThan Protocol
As for the correctness, we will simply explain why x < y ⇔ X < Y . In this protocol, we view the Digit-Bit-wise representation of x and y as two binary numbers (i.e. X and Y ). When m < 2 L(m) , the two binary numbers (i.e. X and Y ) are of course not equal to the original numbers (i.e. x and y). However, when comparing x and y this is allowed because, both in the digit-bit-wise representation case and in the binary case, the relationship between the size of two numbers is determined by the left-most differing bits of them. So, we can say that x < y ⇔ X < Y and the correctness is guaranteed.
Privacy follows readily from only using private sub-protocols. The complexity of the protocol is the same with the Bitwise-LessThan protocol involved. The length of the inputs to the Bitwise-LessThan
So, the overall complexity of this protocol is 6 rounds and (about) 14l multiplications.
Random-Solved-Digits-Bits
The Random-Solved-Digits-Bits protocol is an important primitive which can generate a digit-bit-wise shared random value unknown to all parties. It is a natural generalization to the Random-Solved-Bits protocol in [DFK + 06]. The details are presented in Figure 7 .
The Random-Solved-Digits-Bits protocol, Random-Solved-Digits-Bits(·), for jointly generating a digit-bit-wise shared value which is uniformly random from Z p .
Input: m, i.e. the expected base of the digits.
, in which r is a uniformly random value satisfying r < p. Process: 
Then, in order to get an acceptable abort probability, the bit-length of the most significant base-m digit of r should be j + 1 because an acceptable r must be less than p. In this protocol, for simplicity, we assume that p The correctness and the privacy is straightforward. As for the complexity, the protocol uses l (m) invocations of Random-Digit-Bit and one invocation of Digit-Bit-wise-LessThan. So, the total complexity of one run of this protocol is 8+6=14 rounds and l (m) · 64L(m) + 14l = 78l multiplications. Similar to the Random-Digit-Bit protocol above, if this protocol has to be repeated in parallel to get a lower abort probability, then the round complexity is still 14, and the amortized communication complexity goes up to 4 × 78l = 312l multiplications.
Digit-Bit-wise-Subtraction
In this section, we will describe in detail the restricted version, Digit-Bit-wise-Subtraction * , which requires that the minuend is not less than the subtrahend. The general version, which can be realized using the techniques in the Bitwise-Subtraction protocol and which is not used in the paper, is omitted for simplicity.
•The Restricted Digit-Bit-wise-Subtraction We will now describe in detail the Digit-Bitwise-Subtraction * protocol. This protocol is novel and is the most important primitive in our Base-m Digit-Bit-Decomposition protocol. Similar to the case in the Digit-Bit-wise-LessThan protocol, we will sometimes view the digit-bit-wise representation of an integer as a binary number directly. We will explain why we can do this in detail later. The details of the protocol is presented in Figure 8 .
Correctness: When calling the BORROWS protocol, we view the digit-bit-wise representation of x and y as two binary numbers X and Y . This does make sense because of the following. For any two binary numbers
The restricted Digit-Bit-wise-Subtraction protocol, Digit-Bit-wise-Subtraction * (·), for computing the digit-bit-wise sharing of the difference between two digit-bit-wise shared values with the minuend not less than the subtrahend. 
So, using the Bitwise-LessThan protocol in both ways, which costs l + √ l more multiplications and no more rounds than one single invocation [Tof09], we can get all the e i s. Then as in the BORROWS protocol (or the CARRIES protocol), the target borrow bits (for every digit-position) can be obtained by using a generic prefix protocol which costs 15 rounds and 47l (m) log l (m) multiplications. So the Digit-Bit-wise-Subtraction * − protocol can be realized in 6+15=21 rounds and (less than) 16l + 47l (m) log l (m) multiplications. Recall that l (m) = log m p . Then for relatively large m, e.g. m ≈ p 1 10 where l (m) = 10, the communication complexity may be very low.
Comments
As in [NO07] , although we describe all our protocols in the secret sharing setting, our techniques are also applicable to the threshold homomorphic setting. All the protocols in our paper can be similarly realized in this setting. However, some of the protocols in this setting may be less efficient than their counterpart in the secret sharing setting because the Random-Bit protocol, which is a basic building block, is more expensive in the threshold homomorphic setting.
It is easy to see that using our Base-m Digit-Decomposition protocol which extracts all the basem digits of the shared input, we can also solve the modulo reduction problem (which requires only the least significant base-m digit). However, our Modulo-Reduction protocol is meaningful because it achieves linear communication complexity and thus is much more efficient.
Obviously, we can say that the bit-decomposition protocol (of [DFK + 06]) is a special case of our Base-m Digit-Bit-Decomposition protocol when m is a power of 2. In fact, we can also view the bitdecomposition protocol as a special case of our enhanced Modulo-Reduction protocol when the modulus m is just p, i.e. we have
for any x ∈ Z p . Our enhanced Modulo-Reduction protocol can handle not only the special case where m = p but also the general case where m ∈ {2, 3, ..., p − 1}, so it can also be viewed as a generalization to bit-decomposition. We note that, in [Tof09], a novel technique is proposed which can reduce the communication complexity of the bit-decomposition protocol to almost linear. We argue that their technique can also be used in our Base-m Digit-Bit-Decomposition protocol (as well as our Base-m Digit-Decomposition protocol ) to reduce the (communication) complexity to almost linear, because their technique is in fact applicable to any PreFix-• (or PostFix-•) protocol (which is a dominant factor of the communication complexity) assuming a linear protocol for computing the UnboundedFanIn-• exists, which is just the case in our protocols.
Applications
Here we show some applications of our protocols. All application protocols proposed here are constantrounds and unconditionally secure. Recall that in this paper we focus on integer arithmetic in the information theory setting. The underlying linear secret sharing scheme is built in field Z p where p is a prime with bit-length l.
Efficient Integer Division Protocol
Given a shared value [x] p and a public modulus m, the integer division protocol
can be realized efficiently using our Modulo-Reduction protocol. Denote t = x m , then we have x = tm + (x mod m). So we can see that, if (x mod m) can be obtained in linear communication complexity, which is just the case in our Modulo-Reduction protocol, then t = x m can also be obtained in linear complexity by setting
Efficient Divisibility Test Protocol
The divisibility test problem can be formalized as follows: So, in a divisibility test protocol, the parties need only to obtain (the sharing or the bitwise sharing of) x mod m and then decide whether it is 0. We provide two options for this task below. Option 1: First the parties get [x mod m] p using our Modulo-Reduction protocol. Then using the Equality-Test protocol or the Probabilistic-Equality-Test protocol in [NO07] , which is realized without bit-decomposition and achieves constant round complexity and linear communication complexity, the parties can determine whether (x mod m) = 0 holds. When the Equality-Test protocol of [NO07] is involved, the total complexity of the above procedure is 8 + 22 = 30 rounds and 81l + (326l + 28L(m) + 3) ≈ 407l + 28L(m) multiplications.
Option 2: Using our enhanced Modulo-Reduction protocol, the parties can get Recall that L(m) ≤ l. Thus the communication complexity of "Option 1" is always linear. However, this is not the case in "Option 2". In fact, when m is large enough, e.g. L(m) = l, the asymptotic communication complexity (of "Option 2") goes up to O(l log l). However, when m is relatively small, e.g. m = 10 which is often the case in practice, "Option 2" can be a better choice.
Conversion of Integer Representation between Number Systems
In multiparty computation, being able to convert integer representation between different number systems is of both theoretical and practical interest. This can be done using our Base-m DigitDecomposition protocol. For example, given the sharings of the base-M digits of integer x, i.e. 
Base-10 Applications
Given a shared value [x] p and m = 10 as inputs, our Base-m Digit-Decomposition protocol (as well as our Base-m Digit-Bit-Decomposition protocol) can output the sharings of the base-10 digits of x. This is meaningful because in real life, integers are (almost always) encoded base-10. We believe that, in multiparty computation for practical use, being able to de-composite a secret shared integer into (the sharings of) its base-10 digits will provide us with a lot of convenience.
Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we give an answer to the open problem whether the public modulo reduction problem can be solved without relying on bit-decomposition. We propose a linear, constant-rounds protocol (i.e. the Modulo-Reduction protocol) for the public modulo reduction problem without relying on bitdecomposition. What's more, we generalize the bit-decomposition protocol, which is a powerful tool for multiparty computation, to the Base-m Digit-Bit-Decomposition protocol, which can convert the sharing of secret x into the sharings of the base-m digits of x, along with the bitwise sharing of every digit. We believe that our Modulo-Reduction protocol and Base-m Digit-Bit-Decomposition protocol will be useful both in theory and application. Although we are successful in providing an (efficient) solution for the public modulo reduction problem, we fail in solving the private modulo reduction problem where the modulus (i.e. the base m) is also secret shared. The absence of the knowledge of the exact value of m makes our techniques useless. We leave it an open problem to construct efficient protocols for private modulo reduction without relying on bit-decomposition. 
